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Abstract
Secure routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks provide the required functionality for proper network
operation. If the underlying routing protocol cannot be trusted to follow the protocol operations, additional
trust layers, such as authentication, cannot be obtained. Threat models drive analysis capabilities, aﬀecting
how we evaluate trust. Current attacker threat models limit the results obtained during protocol security
analysis over ad hoc routing protocols. Developing a proper threat model to evaluate security properties
in mobile ad hoc routing protocols presents a signiﬁcant challenge. If the attacker strength is too weak, we
miss vital security ﬂaws. If the attacker strength is too strong, we cannot identify the minimum required
attacker capabilities needed to break the routing protocol. In this paper we present an adaptive threat
model to evaluate route discovery attacks against ad hoc routing protocols. Our approach enables us to
evaluate trust in the ad hoc routing process and allows us to identify minimum requirements an attacker
needs to break a given routing protocol.
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1 Introduction
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) consist of portable wireless nodes that do not
use predetermined communication infrastructure. Each node in a MANET imple-
mentation can operate as source, destination, or intermediate router. Ad hoc rout-
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ing protocols provide the functionality necessary for wireless nodes to communicate
with nodes outside their local transmission range. Ad hoc routing protocols [3,14]
commonly utilize two-phased routing approaches, in which a route is ﬁrst deter-
mined using a route discovery phase and data is then forwarded between a given
source-destination pair over the identiﬁed route.
In order for MANET routing protocols to function as desired, we must trust
that intermediate nodes within the routing path follow the protocol rules. Trusting
intermediate nodes to follow the protocol rules is a signiﬁcant issue in MANETs,
as these networks consist of highly dynamic nodes. Nodes may join or leave the
network and network topology changes with mobility.
Developing a proper threat model against MANET routing protocols presents
a signiﬁcant challenge. Deﬁning a threat model is directly related to applying as-
sumptions to attacker capabilities. The attacker strength may range from assuming
the attacker has the same power and capability of a non-malicious node to assuming
the attacker has virtually no limitations, 5 as viewed in the classical Dolev-Yao [7]
attacker model.
In this paper we propose an adaptive threat model to analyze attacks against the
route discovery phase in MANET routing protocols. By using an adaptive threat
model, we can identify the minimum attacker capabilities required to break a given
routing protocol. This approach is diﬀerent than the traditional approach that lim-
its, or bounds, the analysis results by placing restrictions on the attacker. In the
traditional approach, authors tend to claim protocol security based on a ﬁxed en-
vironment. However, the security results are only applicable if analyzed within the
author’s assumptions on the attacker capabilities. These secure routing protocols
may not be secure outside of the respective assumptions. For instance, work in [3]
lists many proposed security solutions along with their operational requirements and
drawbacks. Inconsistent operational and security requirements result in claimed se-
cure routing protocols that have ﬂaws and are vulnerable to attacks. Additionally,
it is infeasible to compare multiple protocols without common assumptions or se-
curity deﬁnitions. Our adaptive threat model does not pose the same artiﬁcial
limitations resulting from bounded security evaluations based on author assump-
tions. The adaptive threat model is intended to analyze MANET routing protocols
for the existence of vulnerabilities, not the absence of such under an author’s stated
limitations. Since we do not ﬁx the attacker capabilities, our technique allows for a
common or baseline comparison between multiple protocols. Adaptive threat mod-
els allows us to eﬀectively analyze the ability to trust intermediate nodes to follow
the routing protocol rules.
In the remainder of this paper we discuss attack sources, the canonical approach
to MANET threat modeling, and identify the limitations faced by existing threat
models. We continue with our major contribution in the proposed adaptive MANET
threat model and provide our conclusions.
5 With the exception of breaking cryptographic primitives in polynomial time.
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2 Attacking Route Discovery
Ad hoc routing protocols face many attacks, to include denial of service, packet
delay, packet modiﬁcation, packet dropping, and others. We focus on attacks against
the route discovery phase. Route discovery attackers attempt to corrupt routes to be
inconsistent with the current network topology. Secure routes are a core component
to the network’s overall trust.
2.1 Attack Sources
We consider two attack sources: outsider or insider.
• Outsider attackers do not have trusted keys. They typically rely on message
relay, replay, or delay to inﬂuence routing protocols.
• Insider threats occur when a fully trusted node, with appropriate keying material,
is compromised.
Malicious insiders are much more diﬃcult to defend against than malicious out-
siders because they hold legitimate keys. Additionally, malicious insiders can gen-
erally act as malicious outsiders as well.
2.2 Classical Routing Attacks
There are known classical attacks that occur against all MANET two-phased routing
protocols. These attacks include the Sybil attack [6], the invisible node attack [10,13]
and routing wormholes [8].
In a Sybil attack, multiple compromised nodes share keying material and can
operate as multiple identities during route discovery. When a Sybil attacker claims
another identity during route discovery, the resulting route does not reﬂect the given
network topology. The attacker is not bound to continue to perform as the forged
identity during the subsequent data communication over the discovered route.
The invisible node attack (INA) occurs when a node participates in a routing
protocol without revealing its identity. An invisible node simply forwards messages
between the source and destination during route discovery, regardless if keying ma-
terial is being utilized or not. Any discovered route that is dependent on the invisible
node reports a path that does not reﬂect the current network topology.
Routing wormholes utilize two nodes to create a tunnel or special out-of-band
network to either make a route appear shorter than it is or to completely hide one
wormhole endpoint.
While there have been numerous attempts to solve these attacks [8,10,11,13,16]
no solution provides a guaranteed defense [2]. The core element enabling these
attacks is the inability to positively identify ones’ neighbors. Without proper iden-
tiﬁcation capabilities, it is impossible to trust the identities of nodes we are com-
municating with, to include the intermediate nodes making up the routing path.
In addition to these classical attacks, we must also evaluate MANET routing
protocols to determine if the protocol messages themselves allow an attacker to cor-
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rupt the route discovery process, subsequently aﬀecting the network trust. Adaptive
threat modeling allows us to evaluate route corruption attempts and identify at-
tacker capabilities under which a protocol may fail.
3 Canonical Threat Modeling
Modeling attacker capabilities poses a signiﬁcant challenge for proper MANET pro-
tocol security analysis. In the security protocol community, the Dolev-Yao [7] model
provides the strongest formal model to eﬀectively evaluate authentication 6 proto-
cols. In the secure routing community, the attacker model does not traditionally
follow formalized attacker models.
3.1 The Dolev-Yao Attacker
The Dolev-Yao model is the traditional approach to formally model attackers against
authentication protocols. The authors deﬁne the attacker as: “someone who ﬁrst
taps the communication line to obtain messages and then tries everything he can to
discover the [shared secret]” [7]. They additionally provide the following attacker
assumptions:
• The attacker hears all messages.
• The attacker is a trusted user and can initiate communication to any node.
• The attacker can be the communication target for any node.
The Dolev-Yao attacker model also assumes perfect cryptography. That is,
it assumes all cryptographic mechanisms are perfectly secure and brute force key
enumeration attacks cannot be performed in polynomial time.
During analysis, the Dolev-Yao attacker uses information obtained from cap-
tured messages to replay, modify, or create new messages, in order to access unau-
thorized secret information. Formal analysis techniques to evaluate authentication
protocols commonly model the initiator and target nodes as endpoints and channel
all communication through a centralized Dolev-Yao attacker [15], as illustrated in
Fig. 1a.
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Fig. 1. Dolev-Yao Attacker
6 Authentication protocols are commonly referred to as cryptographic protocols, not to be confused with
secure routing protocols.
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Since the intermediate nodes comprising the physical path are irrelevant to the
end-to-end authentication security requirement, the attacker is modeled as the com-
munication channel between the initiator and target. The modeled attacker simply
relays all messages between the initiator-target pair until it accumulates the infor-
mation required to inject messages and break the protocol. The attacker can replace
any message, since message deliverability between an initiator-target pair cannot be
guaranteed in a distributed environment. Since the attacker captures all messages,
it can build its knowledge base over extracted information, such as a session key or
nonce. 7 When evaluating authentication protocols with a centralized attacker, one
must remind themselves they are not modeling the physical communication hops,
but modeling an end-to-end message abstraction.
3.2 MANET Attacker Models
While the Dolev-Yao approach provides an eﬀective means to formally model at-
tacks against authentication protocols, modeling attacks against MANET routing
protocols poses a diﬀerent requirement.
An authentication (or cryptographic) protocol’s goal is generally to share a secret
between an authenticated source and destination. The Dolev-Yao approach eﬀec-
tively encapsulates attacks against an authentication protocol’s end-to-end security
requirement. As Fig. 1a indicates, the end-to-end security requirement does not
consider intermediate nodes within the communication path. Authentication pro-
tocol security evaluations usually do not consider attacks against the path between
the initiator-target pair.
On the other hand, MANET secure routing protocols must ensure the route
discovery process delivers routes that reﬂect the current network topology. The
actions taken by the intermediate nodes making up the route are signiﬁcant and
cannot be abstracted out of the formal model during security evaluations over the
route discovery process. In the context of secure ad hoc routing protocols, the
Dolev-Yao attacker can be viewed according to Fig. 1b, where the attacker has a
communication link to all network nodes.
The Dolev-Yao attacker in a MANET environment can capture any message in
the network and can transmit a message to any network node. Since the attacker
can eﬀectively reduce communication between any two nodes to a two-hop network
channeled through the attacker, the Dolev-Yao attacker provides the strongest at-
tacker model for evaluating MANET routing protocols. If a routing protocol can
be shown secure against a Dolev-Yao attacker, the protocol will be secure against
any attacker capability.
Unfortunately, the Dolev-Yao model is not traditionally used to evaluate
MANET routing protocols. The most common approach to model attacker ca-
pabilities used throughout the MANET community is to assume the attacker node
has the same capabilities as any node within the network. Forcing an attacker to
use nodes without any additional capability unrealistically limits the attacker. Re-
7 A nonce is a random number used once in an authentication protocol instance.
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sults from a limited attacker evaluation may claim security that can be subverted by
changing the attacker restrictions. Fortunately, there have been some recent eﬀorts
to more formally model the attacker.
Active-n-m Attacker. Work in [9] presents a formalized attacker model as
active-n-m, where n is the number of compromised insiders that hold keying mate-
rial, and m is the total number of attacker nodes in the network. All attacker nodes
in the active-n-m approach have the same capabilities as non-malicious nodes, plus
the nodes have the ability to distribute compromised keys to all other m-1 attackers.
The authors in [1] utilize the active-n-m approach with an additional conﬁgura-
tion limitation. They combine all neighboring attackers that can share information
from captured messages during network operation into a single node. The com-
bined single attacker is therefore limited in its transmission capability from a single
node location, eﬀectively changing the network topology. Forcing two attackers that
can communicate with one another to be represented as a single entity may overly
restrict attacker capabilities. The two nodes are now modeled to act as a single
transmission point, which is not representative of the true network topology. This
approach is inappropriate, since non-malicious nodes cannot assume the attackers
will cooperate as a single entity to provide a path during route discovery.
Parmetric Attacker. The parametric attacker approach in [12] further re-
ﬁnes the active-n-m attacker. The parametric attacker, represented by A(k, SA),
identiﬁes the number of attacker nodes k and the initial pre-distributed attacker
knowledge SA, such as keys. The Dolev-Yao attacker is included as a special bound-
ary case, in which each network link contains a parametric attacker. However, the
authors do not indicate how the Dolev-Yao boundary case interacts with the pro-
tocol. Additionally, the authors do not allow colluding attackers to share captured
information during network operation. The scenarios they evaluate contain a single
adversary with the same communication capabilities exhibited by the non-malicious
nodes.
Both the active-n-m and the non-boundary case parametric attacker are scenario
dependent. That is, security analysis results using these attacker models vary,
depending on network conﬁguration, and the location and number of attacker nodes.
Attacks may be overlooked if analyzed in the wrong topology.
4 An Adaptive Threat Model
In our modeling approach, we wish to maintain Dolev-Yao attacker strength to
determine if the route discovery process can possibly be violated. That is, can a
route be returned that is not consistent with the current network topology? It is
important to focus on possible route violations instead of probable attacks based
on network conﬁgurations, number of attackers, or attacker strength, since we are
interested in determining if routing attacks exist against a given protocol. If a
protocol is secure against the Dolev-Yao attacker it will provide security against all
attackers.
While the Dolev-Yao attacker provides the strongest modeling approach, mod-
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eling the strongest attacker does not provide the precision to identify the minimum
capabilities required to break a protocol. Understanding the minimum capabilities
required to break a routing protocol provides signiﬁcant understanding into what
expected environments the protocol can successfully ﬁnd trusted routes.
Assuming that the attacker cannot break cryptographic primitives in polynomial
time, the attacker capability, or strength, is determined by:
• The attacker’s communication capability.
• Whether the attacker is an insider or an outsider.
• Whether a single or multiple attackers exist.
The attacker communication range and ability to share information with other
attackers relate to the attacker’s ability to learn information required to break a
protocol. The attacker’s status as an insider vs. an outsider determines what type
of messages the attacker can generate.
Our adaptive modeling approach attempts to identify the minimum attacker
strengths required to corrupt routes returned by the route discovery phase. This
approach follows work in [5] to look beyond the capabilities provided by the Dolev-
Yao model during authentication protocol analysis and evaluate diﬀerent attacker
environments in ubiquitous systems. Adapting the attacker capabilities allow us
to identify the conditions in which an attack is successful and does not suﬀer from
limitations imposed by restricting the attacker. At the same time, including the
Dolev-Yao attacker ensures that attacks missed by a weaker attacker due to network
conﬁgurations can still be discovered.
4.1 The Model
We oﬀer the attacker classiﬁcation shown in Fig. 2, tailored speciﬁcally to search for
route integrity attacks against MANET routing protocols. Route integrity attacks
corrupt the route discovery process, resulting in returned paths that do not exist for
the given network topology. Analysis using the adaptive attacker views the mobile
network as a snapshot in time, since valid routes that fail due to node movement
are not malicious. Our adaptive attacker classiﬁcation allows the security analyst
the ability to identify capabilities required to break a routing protocol. Evaluating
a protocol against the spectrum of attacker capabilities provides a more complete
security analysis outcome, as opposed to claiming security based on a restricted
attacker that may be easily subverted by an unlimited adversary or under diﬀerent
operational scenarios.
Within our attacker classiﬁcation, an outsider node has the capability to capture
any messages transmitted within its reception range, can replay any messages it has
captured, and can create messages from information it has recovered from original
knowledge or captured messages. The attacker’s goal is to return a route that is
not consistent with the current network topology. The intended eﬀects depend on
whether the attacker is an outsider or a trusted insider.
The malicious outsider’s goals are to either corrupt the route so that an invalid
T.R. Andel, A. Yasinsac / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 197 (2008) 3–14 9
Attacker Strength Communication Capability 
Insider/ 
Outsider
Attacker
Category 
Attacker Goal on Route 
Integrity
Outsider I 
x Add self to route 
x Corrupt route x Same as non-malicious node 
Insider II x Corrupt route 
Outsider III 
x Add self to route 
x Corrupt route 
x Unlimited receive radius 
x Transmission radius same as non-
malicious node Insider IV x Corrupt route 
Outsider V 
x Add self to route 
x Corrupt route 
Single Intruder 
x No limitations 
        (Dolev-Yao) 
Insider VI x Corrupt route 
x Same as non-malicious node Insider VII x Corrupt route 
x Unlimited receive radius 
x Transmission radius same as non-
malicious node 
Insider VIII x Corrupt route 
Multiple Intruders 
(all intruder keys 
shared)
x No limitations 
        (Dolev-Yao) 
Insider IX x Corrupt route 
Fig. 2. Attacker Classiﬁcation
path from the source to the destination exists or to add itself to the route, since it is
not an authorized user. Insider nodes have the added capability to sign messages, as
they hold a trusted cryptographic key. Since malicious insiders are authorized users,
adding themselves to a valid route does not constitute an attack for the malicious
insider. Therefore, malicious insiders only attempt to corrupt the route.
In order to identify the required attacker strength to break a protocol, our at-
tacker classiﬁcation looks at both single intruders and multiple intruders, along with
various communication capabilities an attacker may have. The attacker capabilities
range from having the same capabilities as a standard node in the network to having
no transmission or reception limitations, as modeled with Dolev-Yao capabilities.
We further reﬁne the Dolev-Yao attacker by allowing the attacker to be an outsider
or an insider. The canonical Dolev-Yao model assumes the attacker is a trusted
insider. We reﬁne the attacker to determine if an attacker without communication
limitations has diﬀerent eﬀects based on whether the adversary has trusted keys or
not.
Between the standard node attacker and the Dolev-Yao extremes, we add an
attacker with an unlimited reception capability and a limited transmission capabil-
ity. This category (classiﬁcations III, IV, and VIII) does not assume the attacker
node follows bi-directional communication rules (i.e., the attacker is asymmetrical),
allowing the attacker to appear as a normal node during transmissions, while at the
same time allowing any message to be received. An attacker with this capability can
arise by having a more powerful transceiver or antenna than the standard network
nodes. However, the attacker can restrict its transmission range by adjusting its
output power.
We illustrate the asymmetrical attacker in Fig. 3. The attacker can capture any
message in the network, allowing it to craft routing attacks if it obtains enabling
information. Since the attacker restricts its transmission to nodes S and D, nodes
n1 and n2 are unaware that a forward link exists to node A. If node A obtains the
correct information, the attacker may be able to remove node n1 from the path
S-n1-n2-D, resulting in the corrupt path S-n2-D. We provide an example attack in
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Section 4.2.
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Fig. 3. Asymmetric Attacker
We can also use the unlimited reception range to abstract out any special net-
work topology conﬁgurations that may help enable an attack. By enabling an
attacker to receive all network traﬃc, we inherently consider any network topology,
attacker position, or additional capabilities provided by collusion between individual
attacker nodes. Therefore, we do not lose any capabilities over the existing active-
n-m approach. For instance, work in [1,4] uses the active-n-m approach to provide
attacks against the Ariadne [9] protocol. These attacks are based on various network
conﬁgurations, including some instances using colluding nodes. All conﬁgurations
and collusion scenarios simply allow the attacker the ability to hear information
that it can then use to create a corrupted routing message. Our unlimited receive
capability option does not require crafty scenarios to receive the correct enabling
information, since all publicly transmitted messages have already been captured.
For multiple intruders, we assume the attackers are always colluding insiders.
We implicitly include multiple outsider attackers since the outsiders have no crypto-
graphic keys to share and the no-limitation outsider option (classiﬁcation V) allows
a single node to receive all information in the network and to direct transmission to
any point in the network. We assume that all malicious insiders collude, since multi-
ple attackers that do not work together do not have any greater capability to corrupt
the route discovery process than a single attacker, although network performance
may be aﬀected. If the attackers follow the standard node capability (classiﬁcation
VII) and are not within each other’s transmission range, we permit the colluding
nodes to at least share cryptographic keys, allowing us to search for attacks enabled
by the ability for a single node to sign or decrypt information computed with the
colluding attacker’s key.
When we allow an unlimited receive radius in a multiple colluding attacker en-
vironment, we allow the nodes to share captured information by hearing the same
messages obtained during protocol operation, regardless of the network conﬁgura-
tion. Sharing information in our model through this mechanism has the same eﬀect
as multiple colluders setting up a secret out-of-band communication mechanism or
having many intermediate colluding nodes that simply relay information between
two malicious attackers.
The adaptive model takes into account any possible network path. Since we can-
not ensure every routing packet is delivered in a wireless networking environment,
we must allow the possibility for any node, or message event sequence, to interact
within one protocol round. 8 That is, if it is possible for an attacker node to break a
8 A route discovery round is a complete route discovery process initiated by one source to ﬁnd a path to
the source’s desired destination.
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protocol round, regardless if a non-malicious node has already processed a message
for that sequence number received from a shorter route, the routing protocol is not
secure since we cannot ensure another route has already been processed. Again, we
are evaluating the routing protocol for possible attacks, not probable attacks.
4.2 An Example
Let us consider an example using our attacker classiﬁcation for a single insider
attacker (classiﬁcations II, IV and VI). We evaluate signature-based Ariadne [9]
against the topology in Fig. 4.
n
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msg4
m
sg2
m
sg
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Fig. 4. Example Single Attacker Topology
During the route request (rreq), each intermediate node adds itself to the route
path, calculates a hash value, produces a signature over the new packet, and broad-
casts a message containing the new path, new hash value, and appended signature.
For example, msg2 is constructed as:
msg2 = (rreq, S,D, hn1, (n1)), (sign1),
where the hash value hn1 is computed by the one-way hash function H as hn1 =
H(n1, hs) and hs is a shared secret between S and D.
In the example scenario, node S attempts to set up a route to node D, with
node A being a malicious insider. The possible routes according the topology are
S-A-D, S-A-n2-D, S-n1-n2-D, and S-n1-n2-A-D.
We do not consider A’s ability to drop packets once a route is set up or A’s
ability to simply relay messages (i.e., the invisible node attack), since we have
already determined these attacks exist. Here we are searching for attacks enabled
by information revealed by the protocol messages. Therefore, we search for A’s
ability to trick the protocol into accepting the invalid path S-n1-A-D or S-n2-A-D.
Using the attacker category II, the adversary has the same capability as all other
nodes in the network. When A receives msg3 from n2, it removes n2 from the path
and n2’s signature. The per-hop, one-way hash value hn2 is intended to guard
against A taking this action, but node A can compute n1’s hash embedded into
msg2 directly from msg1, since hn1 = H(n1, hs). The destination node D validates
the hash value and signatures, accepting the path S-n1-A-D, which does not exist.
Node D then creates a signed route reply (rrep) in msg5, through A to node S. The
complete message transmission for the attack follows, with *msg4 introducing the
malicious path:
msg1 = (rreq, S,D, hs()), (sigs)
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msg2 = (rreq, S,D, hn1, (n1)), (sigs, sign1)
msg3 = (rreq, S,D, hn2, (n1, n2)), (sigs, sign1, sign2)
∗msg4 = (rreq, S,D, hA, (n1, A)), (sigs, sign1, sigA)
where hA = H(A,hn1) = H(A,H(n1, hs))
msg5 = (rrep, S,D, (n1, A)), (sigD).
This attack is the same attack presented in [4]. However, the attack depends
on the network topology. In order for this attack to be possible, node A must be
able to receive msg1, msg3, and msg5, and be able to transmit msg4 to D and relay
msg5 to S. Consider what would happen if the link between n2 and A did not exist.
Node A would never recover sign1 from msg3. We can create the same attack if we
allow A the ability to receive all messages. If A has an unlimited receive capability
(category IV), it can extract n1’s signature and hash value directly from msg2,
resulting in the ability to create the same corrupted path S-n1-A-D. However, we
still require the ability to send and receive messages between S and D.
Our ﬁnal classiﬁcation for the single malicious insider (category VI) provides no
restrictions as the full Dolev-Yao model, which imposes no topology requirements
to duplicate the previous attack. The Dolev-Yao attacker acts as a fail-safe in case
the previous categories failed to discover an attacker due to the network topology
that was evaluated. However, exclusively using the Dolev-Yao model would not
have allowed us the ability to identify the minimum attacker capabilities required
to break the protocol.
As the example indicates, the category II attacker utilizing standard node ca-
pabilities depends on the network topology chosen for the evaluation. To ensure
this attack is found during evaluation against a category II attacker, all network
conﬁgurations need to be considered. Topology dependent attacks challenge the
security analyst to a grueling manual evaluation process to evaluate all possible
network conﬁgurations. Our adaptive threat model provides the attacker strength
of the Dolev-Yao attacker to discover if an attack is possible in any topology and
provides the precision to identify minimum attacker capabilities if evaluated within
an enabling network topology.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we discussed the various attacker threat models being used to evalu-
ate the MANET route discovery process. We saw how the current threat models
may overly restrict the attacker’s capabilities, resulting in claimed secure routing
protocols that may actually be easily attacked, due the fact that we cannot assume
an attacker will follow the restrictions assumed by the analyst.
Our contribution provides an adaptive threat model for MANET security eval-
uations. Instead of claiming protocol security based on attacker assumptions, we
adapt the attacker capabilities in order to determine at what point a protocol may
fail. By adjusting the attacker communication capabilities, we do not rely on spe-
cial network topologies to enable attacks. Our model presents us with a diﬃcult
challenge. We now have many diﬀerent attack scenarios that we must evaluate. For
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instance, the attacker model presented in Fig. 2 requires the security analyst to an-
alyze nine diﬀerent scenarios to provide a complete analysis picture. This analysis
requirement drives research into automated analysis techniques.
While we have presented a handful of possible ad hoc routing attacks, we contend
that any attack against the ad hoc route discovery phase could be represented and
discovered utilizing our adaptive attacker classiﬁcation. Our adaptive model ensures
attackers are discovered via the unrestricted Dolev-Yao attacker, while at the same
time provides the precision to investigate minimum capabilities (communication
limits, trusted insider or outsider, single or multiple attackers) required to corrupt
MANET routing protocols.
Until MANET routing protocols can be secured and properly evaluated, ultimate
network trust cannot be achieved.
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